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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Douglas Malar appeals from the district court’s Judgment summarily dismissing
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. While Mr. Malar’s petition was not timely filed
from the Judgment of Conviction, the district court erred in summarily dismissing the
petition because the parties tried by consent his claim that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to file an appeal from the order revoking probation, and the petition was timely
from the order revoking probation.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Douglas Malar entered an Alford plea to one count of felony DUI in Kootenai
County case number CR-2012-1289. (R., pp.4, 18.) He was sentenced on May 11,
2012, to four years, with two years fixed, but the sentence was suspended and he was
placed on probation. (R., pp.4, 18.) Mr. Malar did not appeal from the judgment of
conviction. (Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository.)

Mr. Malar violated his probation

and the sentence was imposed on January 9, 2015. (R., p.18.) Mr. Malar filed an Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion requesting leniency on January 12, 2015. (Idaho
Supreme Court Data Repository.) Mr. Malar did not appeal from the order revoking
probation. (Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository.)
On May 18, 2015, Mr. Malar filed a Petition seeking Post-Conviction Relief.
(R., pp.4-10.)

In his Petition, Mr. Malar asserted that law enforcement withheld

information favorable to the defense and that his trial attorney’s representation was
deficient because the attorney failed to raise issues at appropriate times, persuaded him
to plead guilty using threats, failed to file a motion to suppress evidence, failed to inform

1

him what constitutes driving under the influence, and wanted to proceed to arraignment
without discovery. (R., pp.4-6.) The relief requested in Mr. Malar’s Petition was to be
able to enter a plea of not guilty and proceed to trial. (R., p.6.) The district court
appointed post-conviction counsel to represent Mr. Malar. (Augmentation, p.5.)
The State filed its Answer which asserted that the post-conviction petition was
untimely. (R., pp.11-13.) On June 24, 2015, the State moved for summary dismissal,
asserting that the Petition was untimely filed where the petition was filed more than a
year after the time to appeal the conviction had expired. (Augmentation, pp.10-12.) On
August 3, 3015, Mr. Malar filed a response to the motion for summary dismissal and an
affidavit in which he asserted that, on three occasions, he asked his attorneys about
appealing his case and was told he could not appeal, and further, that his attorneys did
not advise him of the possibility of a post-conviction action. (Augmentation, pp.13-15;
R., pp.14-16.) Mr. Malar asserted that he did not learn of the possibility of a postconviction until he arrived at prison; thus, the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel
led to the untimely filing of his post-conviction petition.

(Augmentation, pp.14-15;

R., p.15.) The State responded, asserting that Mr. Malar failed to state any facts or
present any evidence in support of his post-conviction claims, that he did not
demonstrate any prejudice, and that there was no basis to toll the statute of limitations.
(Augmentation, pp.16-24.)
Thereafter, a hearing was held on the State’s motion for summary dismissal.
(8/25/15 Tr.) At the hearing, Mr. Malar, through his counsel, advised the district court
that he intended to move the court for permission to file an amended petition, should the
court not grant the State’s motion to dismiss, and argued against dismissal of the case.

2

(8/25/15 Tr., p.7, L.4 – p.11, L.5.)

The district court found that the State had not

controverted Mr. Malar’s claim that he asked for an appeal and did not get one.
(8/25/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.5-6.) The State conceded that Mr. Malar received ineffective
assistance of counsel but contended that he had not shown prejudice.

(8/25/15

Tr., p.12, Ls.9-25.)
On August 27, 2015, the district court dismissed Mr. Malar’s post-conviction
petition as untimely filed. (R., pp.17-25.) Thereafter, the district court entered a final
judgment on September 30, 2015. (R., pp.26-27.)
Mr. Malar filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the
petition. (R., pp.28-31, 35-39.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Malar’s Post-Conviction Petition after finding it
was untimely filed?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Malar’s Entire Post-Conviction Petition For
Untimeliness Where The Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File
An Appeal From The Order Revoking Probation Was Timely Filed
Mr. Malar established that issues of material fact existed as to his assertion that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the revocation of Mr. Malar’s
probation after Mr. Malar requested an appeal. In support of his claims, Mr. Malar
submitted evidence in the form of a sworn affidavit. There was no evidence submitted
which controverted Mr. Malar’s claims and the State conceded that counsel was
ineffective.

As such, Mr. Malar certainly should have been allotted an evidentiary

hearing on this claim.
A.

Post-Conviction Jurisprudence
In an appeal from post-conviction proceedings, the appellate court will exercise

free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to the facts. Nellsch v.
State, 122 Idaho 426, 434 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). The review of “a district
court’s construction and application of a statute, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act (UPCPA), is a matter of free review.” Evensioski v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190
(2001) (citations omitted).
A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from the underlying
criminal action which led to the petitioner’s conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,
456 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to 4911), and the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456. Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner
must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Charboneau v. State,
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144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). However, the petition initiating post-conviction proceeding
differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition is required to
include more than “a short and plain statement of the claim”; it “must be verified with
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records
or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must
state why such supporting evidence is not attached.” Id.; I.C. § 19-4903.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through
post-conviction proceedings. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25 (Ct. App. 1992).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show
that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient—that the attorney’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).
After a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.” Strickland, at 694; Aragon, at 760.
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.C. § 19-4906(c). In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the district
court need not “accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported
by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.” Martinez v. State, 126
Idaho 813, 816-17 (Ct. App. 1995). Additionally, the district court need not accept those
of the petitioner’s allegations which are “clearly disproved by the record.” Coontz v.
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State, 129 Idaho 360, 368 (Ct. App. 1996). However, if the petitioner presents some
shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take the
petitioner’s allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the
State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968) (holding that the State’s motion to
dismiss was unsupported by any affidavits or depositions, and therefore did not
“controvert” the facts alleged in the petitioner’s application). This is so even if the
allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. The district court is required to accept
the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but is not required to accept the
petitioner’s conclusion. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Thus, only after the State
controverts the petitioner’s allegations can the district court consider the evidence.
Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982). In doing so, it must still liberally
construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner. Small v.
State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998).
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Id. If there is no question of fact, and if the
State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can be ordered sua sponte, or
pursuant to the State’s motion. I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c).
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does not involve the
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court’s summary dismissal
order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006).
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B.

The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Malar’s Entire Post-Conviction Petition
For Untimeliness Where The Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For
Failing To File An Appeal From The Order Revoking Probation Was Timely Filed
As a preliminary matter, although the assertions that Mr. Malar thrice asked his

counsel about filing an appeal and failed to tell Mr. Malar about a post-conviction action
were not specifically pled in Mr. Malar’s Petition, such claims were stated in the affidavit
accompanying his response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.1415.) The district court discussed the issue with the parties during the August 25, 2015
hearing, considered the information contained therein as constituting post-conviction
claims, and characterized the allegations as Mr. Malar “asked for an appeal and didn’t
get one.” (8/25/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.5-6.) At that point, the State conceded that Mr. Malar
received ineffective assistance of counsel.

(8/25/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.9-10.)

As such,

Mr. Malar submits that the issue of whether his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
file a notice of appeal from the revocation of his probation despite his request for an
appeal was tried by consent of the parties, and is therefore properly before this Court.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) provides in part that, “[w]hen issues not
raised by the parties are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” I.R.C.P. 15(b). The
purpose of this rule is to allow, “cases to be decided on the merits, rather than upon
technical pleading requirements.” Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875 (Ct. App.
2008). Given this, in some cases there may be trial by consent of an issue that was not
formally pled.
The district court has discretion to determine whether the parties have consented
to the trial of the un-pled issue. Monahan, 145 Idaho at 875. Implied consent is not
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established merely because evidence relevant to an un-pled issue was introduced
without objection. Id. Rather, it must appear that the parties understood the evidence
to be aimed at the issue omitted from the pleadings. Id.
Evidence militating against a finding of trial by consent includes a showing under
the record that the opposing party objected to the litigation of the un-pled issue or the
district court rules that the issue could not be raised. Id. at 875-877. “[W]hen a theory
is fully tried by the parties, I.R.C.P 15(b) allows the court to base its decision on a theory
not pleaded and ‘deem the pleadings amended accordingly[.]’” Dunlap v. State, 141
Idaho 50, 57 (2004) (quoting Paterson v. State, 128 Idaho 494, 502 (1996)).
Here, the issue of whether Mr. Malar’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
file a notice of appeal from the order revoking probation was fully, expressly, and
independently litigated by all of the parties in this case, and was addressed by the
district court in its order granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal. At the
August 25, 2015 hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal, post-conviction
counsel raised the issue of whether Mr. Malar’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
file a notice of appeal from the order revoking probation. (8/25/15 Tr., p.7, L.9 – p.9,
L.9.) The district court asked the State to address the allegations that Mr. Malar asked
for an appeal but did not get one. (8/25/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.5-6.) Counsel for the State did
not object to the court’s consideration of this issue; and, in fact, the State argued the
merits of this issue at the hearing as well. (8/25/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.7-25.)
And this assertion was considered by the district court in issuing its decision. In
its Memorandum Decision and Order on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Dismissal,
the court identified it as an issue:
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Petitioner alleges that he notified his counsel on three separate occasions
that he wanted to file an appeal and that he did not believe he was guilty
of felony DUI. Petitioner alleges that his requests to file an appeal were
not carried out by his court-appointed counsel.
(R., p.18) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, this theory was fully tried by consent.
Regarding the district court’s decision to dismiss the Petition in its entirety,
including the claim that Mr. Malar requested an appeal after his probation was revoked,
the United States Supreme Court has held that:
[A] lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a
notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable. This
is so because a defendant who instructs counsel to initiate an appeal
reasonably relies upon counsel to file the necessary notice. Counsel's
failure to do so cannot be considered a strategic decision; filing a notice of
appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention
to the defendant's wishes.
Roe v. Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
In Mata v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a defendant who asks his
attorney to appeal is deprived of effective assistance of counsel if that attorney fails to
file an appeal, and the loss of the opportunity to appeal constitutes sufficient prejudice
to support such a claim. 124 Idaho 588, 593 (1993); see also Beasley v. State, 126
Idaho 356, 361-62 (Ct. App. 1994); Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71, 74 (Ct. App. 2012).
Here, Mr. Malar claimed he discussed an appeal with trial counsel, and he was
told no appeal was possible on three occasions. Mr. Malar asserted in Section 6 of his
affidavit,
[Defense counsel] was assigned as my Public Defender when my
sentence was imposed on January 9, 2015. I asked him about appealing
my case and was told I could not appeal my sentence or conviction
regardless of the fact that I entered an Alford Plea. I entered a Rule 35
plea at that time.
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(R., p.15.)

Ultimately, the district court accepted the claims made by affidavit and

characterized them as “requests to file an appeal” in making its decision on the State’s
motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.18-20.) The district court, relying on the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), found
the unheeded request for an appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel which
resulted in the forfeiture of an opportunity to be heard, and in such circumstances
prejudice is presumed in favor of the petitioner. (R., p.23.)
While the district court recognized that Mr. Malar asserted that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because he had asked whether he would appeal his
conviction on three occasions and was told he could not, the district court only analyzed
it in terms of whether such could justify equitable tolling. (R., pp.21-24.) The district
court correctly found that such conduct was prima facie evidence of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (R., p.23.) However, the district court failed to recognize that a
post-conviction action filed less than seven months after Mr. Malar’s request to appeal
from the order revoking probation was a timely filed action.

Such was error as

Mr. Malar’s Petition was timely filed from the last request made on January 9, 2015,
after his probation had been revoked. (R., p.15.)
Mr. Malar’s Petition was timely filed where he had asked his counsel to appeal
the revocation of probation the day his probation was revoked, counsel clearly did not
do so, and Mr. Malar filed his post-conviction petition seven months later. Thus, the
district court erred where it concluded that all aspects of the Petition were untimely, and
dismissed the Petition in its entirety.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Malar respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, vacate the judgment, and
remand the case with instructions to enter a new judgment on the probation violation.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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